Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

Sharlene Francisconi v. Becky Hall abnd/or John
Does 1-2, Janes Does 1-2 : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gregory Constantino; Constantino Law Office.
E. Craig Smay; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Francisconi v. Hall, No. 20070331 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/191

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Appeal No. 20070331
Civil No. 040922431

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SHARLENE FRANCISCONI,

REPLY BRIEF

Appellee,
vs.
BECKY HALL and/or JOHN DOES 1-2,
JANE DOES 1-2.
Appellant.

Mr. Gregory Constantino
CONSTANTINO LAW OFFICE, P.C.
8537 S. Redwood Road, Suite D
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Ph: (801)530-5050
Fx:(801) -530-1333

E. Craig Smay (#2985)
E. Craig Smay P.C.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ph:(801)539-8515
Fx:(801)539-8544
Attorney for Appellant, Becky Hall
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

NOV 2 1 2007 l

Appeal No. 20070331
Civil No. 040922431
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SHARLENE FRANCISCONI,

REPLY BRIEF

Appellee,
vs.
BECKY HALL and/or JOHN DOES 1-2,
JANE DOES 1-2.
Appellant.

Mr. Gregory Constantino
CONSTANTINO LAW OFFICE , P.C.
8537 S. Redwood Road, Suite D
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Ph: (801)530-5050
Fx:(801) -530-1333

E. Craig Smay (#2985)
E. Craig Smay P.C.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ph: (801)539-8515
Fx: (801) 539-8544
Attorney for Appellant, Becky Hall

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

3

THE INITIAL JUDGMENT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE UNDER RULE 54(b) .. 5
AMENDMENT WAS IMPROPERLY DENIED FOR "DELAY" IN SEEKING TO AMEND
WHILE THE PARTIES WERE UNDER ORDER HOLDING PROCEEDINGS IN
ABEYANCE

9

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCUSED PLAIN ANTICIPATORY BREACH
AND ADOPTED A CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONTRACT UNCONSCIONABLE ON ITS
FACE

10

CONCLUSIONS

16

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.
Aguirre v. Albertsons, Inc. 117 P.3d 1012, 1022 (Ore. Apps. 2005)

8

Blakely Oil, Inc. v. Crowder, 292, P.2d 842, 844 (Ariz- 1956)

8

Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 740, 741, n.l (Utah 1984)

5

Hallv. Utah State Dept. of Corrections P.3d 958, 962 (Utah 2001)

6

In re: Diafos, 37 P.3d 304, 307 (Wash. Apps. 2001

8

In re: Intelliquest Media Corp., 326 B.R. 825, 830 (10 Cir. 2005)

5

Leev. Barnes, 977 P.2d 530,552 (Utah Apps. 1999).

12

Matter of Estate of Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015, 1016-17 (U. Apps. 1997)

5

Myers v. Olson, 676 P.2d 822, 825-26 (N.M 1984)

8

Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah 1994)

6

Wilson V. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 150 P.3d 653, 662 (Wyo. 2007)

8

U.R.C.P.
Rule 54(b)

4, 5, 7, 6, 8

Rule 60(b)

4, 5, 8, 9,10

Rule60(a)(b)

6

Rule 24(a)(9)

8

Rule 7(f)(1)

8

U.R.A.P.
Rule 4(c)

4
3

Appellee's Brief is directed chiefly to recitation of facts, which, to the extent
pertinent, have been formalised in findings by the District Court. Unless appellee intends
to contest the findings, they are binding, and appellee's lengthy recitation is irrelevant.
Appellee's Brief appears to argue, simply, that if the District Court was correct
about its authority to set aside Judge Henriod's Order of January 19, 2005, then the matter
may not be challenged, or, if the District Court were correct that appellant failed to
exercise an exclusive remedy for appellee's preliminary breach, then that part of the
matter may not be challenged, and so on. The Brief, however, does not attempt to defend
the challenged positions of the District Court: it merely equates a challenge of the District
Court's claim of authority with "inadequate briefing". It does not argue, for example, that
in the facts and circumstances of this case, the District Court actually had the authority
claimed to set aside the Order of January 19, 2005, under Rule 54(b), or under any
authority except Rule 60(b), or that what the District Court called an exclusive remedy for
appellee's acknowledged anticipatory breach was either a remedy, or exclusive.
That is, appellee's brief appears to acknowledge that if the District Court was
wrong on such fundamental points, positions appellee does not attempt to defend, no part
of the ruling below can stand.
Appellee's claim that the Notice of Appeal herein was untimely is fully disposed
of by Rule 4(c), U.R.A.P.
4

The Initial Judgment Could Not Have Been Set Aside Under Rule 54(b)
Appellee's entire response to the assertion that the initial judgment in this matter
was set aside in violation of Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., is to claim that vacation of the
judgment was not pursuant to Rule 60(b), but pursuant to Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., relating
to "judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties". In fact, the Order
on Hearing of December 19, 2005, and supporting Findings and Conclusions do not assert
Rule 54(b) as a basis. No effort is made to show that Rule 54(b) applies.
Appellant's Brief properly raises the issue whether the initial judgment in this case
could be set aside on any grounds except the grounds permitted by Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P.
While orders in multi-party or multi-claim cases, which are not final because they do not
dispose of all claims or the rights of all parties, may be amended at any time before
finality under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., at least by the judge who made them, the Order in
issue in this single party, single claim case was plainly final. It disposed of all claims of
the parties relating to the subject realty, leaving nothing but enforcement. Cannon v.
Keller, 692 P.2d 740, 741, n.l (Utah 1984); Matter of Estate of Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015,
1016-17 (U. Apps. 1997); In re Intelliquest Media Corp., 326 B.R. 825, 830 (10 Cir.
2005) (court approved settlements treated as final judgements). Indeed, appellee's
Motion to Set Aside under Rule 60 was in response to a demand for enforcement.
Appellee's elaborate statement of facts nowhere contests appellants' assertion that a final
5

order had been entered. Rule 54(b) provides no independent ground for vacating the
initial judgment in this case.
Cases under Rule 54(b) all emphasize its specific application to multi-party, multiclaim cases. E.g., Hall v. Utah State Dept. of Corrections P.3d 958, 962 (Utah 2001);
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah 1994).
Cases allowing amendments under Rule 54(b) do so on the basis of the following
language of the Rule:
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved,....
Any order or other form of decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
See Hall, supra, 24 P.3d at 962; Trembly, supra, 844 P.2d 1311. The rule allowing
amendments under Rule 54(b) is specific to cases involving multiple parties and/or
multiple claims, and applies only to orders which adjudicate less than all rights or claims.
The present was an action in rem, for the possession of realty, with a single party
on each side. The order disposed of the res, and left neither party with a claim to pursue.
All that remained was enforcement of the order. Indeed, appellee's Motion to Set Aside
6

Order pursuant to Rule 60(a),(b) was interposed in response to an enforcement
proceeding. The order was final, not subject to further proceedings under Rule 54(b).
Cannon, supra; Estate of Morrison, supra; Intelliquest, supra.
The District Court's Ruling and Order of October 28, 2005, that "plaintiffs
Motion to Set Aside Order and Motion to Allow the Parties to Resume Litigation . . . for
all intents and purposes present the court with a motion to enforce (or not) an alleged
settlement agreement", could not alter the nature of the proceedings, or confer authority
on the court which it did not otherwise have. The settlement in issue had been enforced
by the entry of an Order approving it. The Motion in issue clearly sought the setting
aside of an existing Order and the resumption of litigation otherwise terminated. It did
not seek approval or disapproval of a settlement pending between the parties. The
suggestion that a settlement was merely "alleged" is simply false: a settlement had been
made in open court, and finalized in a proper Order. It was mere pretense that a
settlement was still pending, from which the parties could still withdraw. Appellant had
relied upon the settlement and Order to her detriment for many months before appellee
moved to set it aside.
In any case, at hearing December 19, 2005, Judge Himonas made findings that a
final order had been entered (Finding No. 14, January 11, 2006), apparently abandoning
any assertion of authority under Rule 54(b)
7

A settlement set forth in a proper order is a judgment. E.g., Blakely Oil, Inc. v.
Crowder, 292, P.2d 842, 844 (Ariz. 1956);. Myers v. Olson, 676 P.2d 822, 825-26 (N.M
1984); In re: Diafos, 37 P.3d 304, 307 (Wash. Apps. 2001); reh. den. 60 P.3d 92; Aguirre
v. Albertsons, Inc. Ill P.3d 1012, 1022 (Ore. Apps. 2005); Wilson v. Lucerne Canal &
Power Co., 150 P.3d 653, 662 (Wyo. 2007). It is to be treated, for "all intents and
purposes", as all other judgments. Id. The District Court's authority to alter the Order of
January 19, 2005, arose exclusively under Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P.
It is plain that Judge Himonas made no attempt to comply with Rule 60(b).
Appellee now specifically so concedes. Brief of Appellee at 28, 33 et seq. The latter rule
is nowhere cited in the Order of January 11, 2006, nor is any ground for action
thereunder claimed in the Order. The Order is not, and does not suffice for, an order
under Rule 60(b). That is, the Order is wholly lacking in any authority to make it.
Appellant has no need to contest any of the factual findings contained in the Order
of January 11, 2006, setting aside the initial judgment All are entirely irrelevant to the
single authority available for setting aside the initial judgement, Rule 60(b). Appellee
need only point out that even if all of the factual findings were true, they would not
sustain the conclusions of law setting aside the initial judgement. Appellate Rule 24(a)(9)
requiring challenges to findings of fact has no application here.
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Further, Judge Himonas ultimately vacated the initial judgement on the ground that
it had been "improvidently entered", allegedly because of inadequate notice to appellee.
Even under Rule 54(b), orders may be vacated on that ground only "by the judge who
made it", in this case, Judge Henriod. Rule 7(f)(1), U.R.C.P.
Likely, that is why, when review of Judge Himonas' Order was subsequently
sought, no attempt was made to defend it under Rule 54(b). See Response to Petition for
Extraordinary Relief, attached hereto.
The fact, now effectively acknowledged by appellee, that the Order setting aside
the initial judgment was made in violation of Rule 60(b), and without authority, disposes
of this matter without more. It is important, however, that the Court reach the remaining
issues as well, because their resolution affects the future exercise of rights in this matter.
Leave to Amend Was Improperly Denied For "Delay" In Seeking to Amend While the
Parties Were Under Order Holding Proceedings in Abeyance
Judge Lindberg plainly did not refuse leave to amend because of delay between the
date of vacation of the original judgement and filing of a formal motion for leave to
amend, as alleged by appellee. Delay is pertinent only where the opposition is not given
notice of the claims to be added by amendment, and suffers some indisposition as a result
The original Amended Answer and Counterclaim, filed within days of the order vacating
the initial judgment, and wrongfully rejected by Judge Lindberg, fully informed appellee

of the claims for which leave to amend was subsequently required, to be sought. Any
.
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ha VQ been the basis of refusal of leave.
Judge Lindberg's ruling specifically charges delay from the date of the original
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Here, the District Court announced at the end of a bench trial that, while appellee
had preliminarily breached the contract in evidence, the Court would ignore the breach
because appellant had not exercised the contract's "exclusive remedy" for such breach.
This position was promptly challenged in appellant's post-trial brief. Such challenge
provided the District Court opportunity to correct the error. The post-trial brief is
appropriately cited in Appellant's Brief as preserving the issue for appeal. Unless
appellee now contests the District Court's findings of fact regarding the preliminary
breach, she cannot claim that the matter was not presented and decided below.
Challenged to cite the contract provision relied upon, the District Court cited
Section 9 of the Contract, in findings and conclusions addressed to the issue. The
pertinent findings and conclusions (Findings 12, 20; Conclusions 30-32) are cited in
appellants' Brief.
The issue whether the District Court improperly excused an acknowledged
preliminary breach by appellee was properly preserved below. The District Court had
ample opportunity to correct its error.
In fact, the District Court's excuse for appellee's anticipatory breach is transparent.
The alleged "exclusive remedy" of Section 9 of the Contract is neither a remedy, nor
exclusive. Appellee does not attempt to argue the contrary. Respecting the issue of
contract interpretation, appellee has correctly recited the standard of review:
U

Questions of contract interpretation not requiring resort
to extrinsic evidence are questions of law, and on such
questions we accord the Trial Court's interpretation
no presumption of correctness. Lee v. Barnes, 977 P.2d 530,
552 (Utah Apps. 199y7.
~ * " "Appellee at 40.

breached the contract as found by the District Court, further performance by appellant
waived. Barring an effective excuse for appellee's behavior, it is unequivocally the
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invalidating appellee's subsequent declaration of forfeiture.
Appellee's imposition of a further lien on the subject property prevented - as it was
so plainly intended to prevent relinaiicmgol (In ptuptih lr keep appdlaiif i, nblii'iiliuii1
current. It was plain, unexcused, anticipatory breach. Further, it forced - as it was so
plainly intended to force - the subsequent "default" by appellant, so that the District

unconscionable, and unenforceable on its face. Respecting Section 9 of the Contract1, it

Except for the liens and encumbrances set forth above, Seller
covenants to keep the property free and clear of liens and
encumbrances arising from the acts of the Seller. So long as Bu\ei ;s
current hereunder, Seller agrees to keep current the payments on an
obligations to which Buyer's interest is subordinate. Should Seller
default on the foregoing covenants on any one or more occasions,
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must be borne in mind that" the liens and encumbrances set forth above" mentioned
therein were made in the name of appellee, obligor, to a lender, obligee: they consist
chiefly of the underlying trust deed. The arrangement was that appellee would keep these
obligations current with sums paid to her by appellant. This is stated by the second
sentence of Section 9: if buyer pays Seller, Seller will pay "Seller's obligee", the lender,
on the existing encumbrances. None of this affects the further covenant contained in
Section 9: "Seller covenants to keep the property free and clear of liens and
encumbrances arising from the acts of the Seller". Nor is this further covenant affected in
any way by the option to Buyer to pay directly on the underlying trust deed should Seller
fail to do so. Paying on a new lien in the event of default will not erase the breach of
having imposed a new lien, which plainly diluted Buyer's ability to provide the funds to
pay on any lien. The provision that appellant could credit sums paid by appellant on
appellee's second mortgage to sums due on the first mortgage provided no relief:
appellee's second borrowing eliminated the equity on which appellant could have

Buyer may, at Buyer fs option, in whole or in part, make good
Seller's default to Seller's obligee, and deduct all expenses so paid
from future payments to Seller, and Seller shall credit all Buyer's
sums so expended to the indebtedness herein created just as if
payments had been made directly to Seller under provisions of
Section 4 above.
13
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caused by eliminating appellants' equity and preventing re-financing, and then to enforce
a forfeiture. She neglects to defend the District Court's finding of excuse: the District

Court's claim of failure to exercise an exclusive remedy is transparently erroneous, and
Utah law forbids appellee to assert a "breach" caused by her own improper behavior.
Appellee by borrowing against appellants' equity first, took the funds which appellant
might have borrowed against her equity and used to keep the contract current. Appellee
violated a specific covenant in doing so. When this maneuver had the intended effect of
preventing appellant paying on the contract, appellee used appellants' remaining escrow
funds to inflate the amount subject to forfeiture, then declared the forfeiture which her
own behavior had induced. If Judge Lindberg's reading of Section 9 were to be taken
seriously, it should have resulted at least in appellant being excused from further
payments during any period appellee had sequestered appellants' funds by maintaining a
second mortgage on the property. The suggestion that appellee had no choice, despite the
"option" language of Section 9, but to attempt to refinance without equity, or simply
default, is incomprehensible.
At least so long as appellee had appellants' funds in hand by borrowing against
appellants' equity - a situation that the District Court found persisted into the "Fall of
2004" (Finding No. 12) - appellant should at least have been excused of any payments on
the Contract. Payments on appellee's debt, whether made by appellant or by appellee
with appellant's equity, should have discharged appellants' obligation. Nevertheless,
appellee declared a forfeiture as of April, 2004. Even had appellee's behavior not been
15

"*' cifically prohibited by the contract, the result was unconscionable on its face, and
I mi mii iifn'ii ealtlli
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as the District Court was required to concede, and the claim that it was excused is
erroneous on its face. Appellants' performance thereafter was excused, and failure of
performance Iheieallu i onhl innl \\w\v llnvn Inn .nrl'i
In short, appellant ne\ er became a tenant-at-will in the subject realty. Appellant
was never in unlawful detainer. She could not have been evicted.
Ill ii'i inch. \ iiiiiil lliiil J lot li'iliiit (ii1. of A pi ml, MUM I was declared in lmu\ ,'OH I

I, \\v

coiitiact had then been terminated by appellee's prior breach.
Conclusions
Ml rulings in this mallei lollowim^ ilie ilisi|ij.ilil"ii ation inl 11 IN I pi; I )rver sliunhl In
reversed in entirety, and the original judgement fully re-instated.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 20th dav of November, 2007.
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_£k^=^E. Craig Splay
Attorney for Appellant
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UTAH SUPREME COURT

BECKY HALL,

)
)

RESPONSE TO PETITION
FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF

)1
)

CaseNo.20060345-SC

Petitioner,
vt>.

HON. DENISE P. LINDBERG,
and HON. DENO HIMONAS,
Respondents.

]

Judge Denise P. Lindberg and Judge Deno Himonas, by and through counsel Brent M.
Johnson of the Administrative OfBce of the Courts, provide the following response to Petitioner
Becky Hall's Petition for Extraordinary Relief.
Introduction
The Respondents will primarily defer to the real-parties-in-interest for the arguments
concerning the substance of the Petition. The Respondents provide this response for the purpose
of identifying the appropriate standard of review, and hopefully for the purpose of more clearly
focusing the issues to be resolved. The Petitioner has not identified the specific basis upon

which she seeks extraordinary relief. Based on the issues raised, the Respondents assert that the
question is whether the trial court egregiously abused its discretion in setting aside the order.
The Respondents assert that the Petitioner has also misidentified the basis upon which a
judgment may be set aside.
Argument
1.

A petition for extraordinary relief may not be used as a substitute for appeal.
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows a litigant to seek extraordinary relief

when "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available." The Utah appellate courts have
consistently stated that a petition for extraordinary relief may not be used as a substitute for
appeal. In Tvler v. Dep't of Human Services, 874 P.2d 119, 120 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
three avenues exist in this jurisdiction for securing review of a nonfinal order, one mandatory and two discretionary. The first avenue
is to petition this court to grant an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure . . . . The second
avenue is to seek certification of an order under Rule 55(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . A third possible avenue, usable
when neither an appeal of right nor an interlocutory appeal is
available, is to invoke this court's power to grant extraordinary
relief under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Review is . . . discretionary with the Utah appellate courts under
Rule65B.
The orders that are being challenged in this matter are not final. The Petitioner
nevertheless has a remedy by filing a petition for interlocutory appeal under Rule 5 of the Utah

2

Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Petitioner claims that this avenue does not provide a speedy
remedy, because of the effect'of the order requiring the posting of a bond or be evicted.
However, through a petition for interlocutoiy appeal, the Petitioner can seek a stay of the orders.
Because this avenue is available, the Petitioner may not seek extraordinary relief.
2.
This court should only issue a writ if the trial court egregiously abused its
discretion.
In State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 922 (Utah App. 1998), the court stated that "abuse of
discretion for Rule 65B writs must be much more blatant than the garden variety abuse of
discretion featured in routine appellate review." The court cited Renn v. Utah State Board of
Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995), for the proposition that an extraordinary writ is
generally only used to correct "a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion." IcL In State v. Henriod,
2006 UT 11, f 5, 131 P.3d 232 the Utah Supreme Court stated that "while the parties seeking
relief under Rule 65B(d) must satisfy the .. . requirements [of the rule], we note that the decision
to grant relief relies entirely within [the discretion of the court.]" A petition must show a gross
and flagrant abuse of discretion, and even at that point, the appellate court is not required to grant
extraordinary relief, but will only issue a writ if the court determines that it is appropriate and
necessary to correct a trial court.
In this case, the Petitioner has not identified the prong in Rule 65B(d) upon which she is
proceeding. However, based on the issues raised, and the arguments in the Petition, it appears as
if the Petitioner is ultimately arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
3

previous order to be set aside. As will be discussed below, the Respondents have not abused
their discretion, particularly an egregious abuse of discretion that would warrant appellate
intervention at this time.
3.
The trial did not abuse its discretion in exercising its inherent authority to set aside
the judgment
The Petitioner is focusing significantly on Rule 60 and Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. As noted by the Petitioner, Rule 60(b) states that "the procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent
action." (emphasis added) The rules provide the procedure by which litigants and courts
implement a court's substantive authority. The court's authority to set aside a judgment exists
independent of the rules of procedure. The rules simply provide the mechanism by which
litigants may ask the court to use that authority.
In Utah Coal and Lumber Restaurant, Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT
100,112, 40 P.3d 581, the Utah Supreme Court stated that. "Utah courts have broad authority to
grant equitable relief as needed." Other jurisdictions have recognized that a court's authority to
set aside a judgment is found in the court's inherent equitable powers. For example, the Court of
Appeal of Florida, in Morgan Yacht Corp., v. Edwards. 386 So.2d 883, 884 (Fla. App. 1980),
stated that "it would be inconceivable to give a judge.. . authority to approve a settlement but
not authority to rescind his action when it is based on misrepresentations and fraud." See also
Charles Ford & Assoc, of the Midwest Inc. v. Goldberg, 129 N.E.2d 337, 340 (HI App. 1955)
4

("the power to vacate or set aside judgments or orders is jurisdictional and not procedural is a
power inherent in that court itself... and exists independently of any statute."); In re Rivera, 91
P.3d 464,466 (Colo. App. 2004) ("courts have equitable authority to set aside or reduce a
support judgment in circumstances that would render its enforcement fundamentally unfair or
unjust."): and Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds 358 N.E.2d 146,148 (Ind. App. 1976) ("Indiana courts
have long had both statutory and equitable powers to set aside or modify erroneous or inequitable
judgments.")
Rule 60(b)(5) states that a court may set aside a judgment when "it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application." Subsection (6) states that a court may
set aside a judgment based on "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment." The rule states that motions must be "made within a reasonable time." After a
reasonable time, a court loses jurisdiction to set aside a judgment, but otherwise a court has
inherent authority to resolve certain'inequities among parties. The issue in this case is therefore
whether the court egregiously abused its discretion in exercising this equitable authority.
As stated, the Respondents will primarily defer to the real-parties-in-interest for thenarguments as to whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting this equitable relief. The
Respondents do not believe that discretion was abused. The court acted appropriately under the
circumstances. The Respondents also assert that, by focusing on the procedural rules,
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and not the court's substantive authority, the Petitioner has failed to make an adequate argument
supporting relief. The Respondents assert that the Petition should therefore be denied.
DATED this

_day of April, 2006.

Brent M. Johnson, Attorney for
Honorable Denise BfLindberg and
Honorable Deno Himonas

MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify tfrat a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Petition for
Extraordinary Relief was fnailed first class, postage prepaid and addressed as follows on this

m*

day of April, 2006,

E. Craig Smay
174 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gregory Comlaa&va
Constantino Law Office
8539 So. Redwood Rd., Suite D
West Jordan, Utah 84084

nllcii'.
Diana Pollock
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